Specialization in Congress

          Specialization in Congress

          The United States Congress has 535 members in both the House and Senate, and arguably makes the most important decisions for the future of Americans. There are more than 300 million Americans that put faith in a small pool of politicians to make educated decisions. One would be ignorant to believe that each one of these legislators is an expert on every piece of legislation that passes through Congress. Feasibly, this just is impossible. To solve this, legislators specialize in certain areas of Congress. There are many different ways to specialize. A Senator could have formerly been an environmental scientist and is now chairman of the Energy and Natural Resources committee. In this example, the legislator is individually specialized and can be deemed an expert on environmental affairs. There is also the possibility that a legislator has been on the Energy and Natural Resources committee for several terms, making him or her also an expert in comparison to the entire body of Congress. Their specialization in this case would be seniority, and their knowledge and ability to make deals with committee members to advance their political interests. Committees themselves are specialists. The committee system in the Senate, for example, sports multiple committees and, “…divides its tasks among 20 committees, 68 subcommittees, and 4 joint committees,” solely because of, “…the high volume and complexity of its work” (U.S. Senate, 2011, p. 1). The individual levels, and the committee level, are only two areas where specialty can arise. Lobbyists also provide expertise and specialization to legislators on complicated matters. Lobby groups fight for their beliefs and policies to be adopted by legislators, and the role of the legislator is to make an informed decision based on the populace’s arguments. To help members of congress decide and “specialize” further, politicians have support staff and aides that can assist in digesting the wealth of information. All of these roles, backgrounds, and tools help the 535 member’s debate and vote on the range of issues presented to Congress.

          Specialization at the individual level still exists, even though the importance of specializing has declined along with committees’ powers. Members are still drawn to issues that either concerns them or their constituents. “Many members come to Congress with preexisting policy interests and often are deeply committed to certain policy views. These commitments influence members’ committee preferences, staffing decisions, and legislative activities” (Smith et al., p. 92). Members of congress usually are passionate about certain policies, and therefore are drawn towards specific committees. When a junior legislator initially joins a committee they are examined by pre-existing committee members, looking at an array of qualities. When members’ personal expertise is exhausted, they can then rely on their staff to collect and interpret information. Barbara Sinclair, author of Unorthodox Lawmaking, states that, “To some extent, senators can substitute staff expertise for personal expertise, and it was the increase in staff, especially in the 1970s, that made it possible for senators to involve themselves effectively in more issues than once was possible” (p. 278). Legislators are now able to expand their interests into multiple areas of policy, without losing expertise. This in turn has strengthened the power and influence of members of congress. Smith writes about how members enforce their specializations, saying, “A member’s most important resource is the power to vote – in subcommittee, in committee, on the floor, or in the conference…As managers of numerous offices – personal, committee, and perhaps even party offices – with their sizable staffs and budgets, members might even be thought of as heading small political enterprises” (p. 97). These political enterprises are now the norm of congress, and are in part due to the rise of specialization at the individual level.

          Pursuing a specialization that satisfies both reelection and personal goals are very advantageous, and such is the case of former Senator Dan Quayle (R-Indiana).  Senator Quayle was the chair of the Senate’s Armed Services subcommittee on Defense Acquisition Policy. His party was defending the Congresses right to political influence on decisions about military contracting. Specialization may sometimes mean being in the right position at the right time, which is the case for Senator Quayle. In his interest for the party and his constituents (Indiana having billions of dollars worth of military contracts), Quayle fought for creating a “task force on procurement,” in which he then chaired and turned into a regular subcommittee (Smith et al., p. 117). Senator Quayle invested his time for this cause, by, “…taking a leadership role on an issue [that] requires an investment of resources far in excess of those involved in casting a vote. Members cannot afford to take on more than a handful of issues at a time” (p.118). In other words, he prioritized and took an opportunity to pursue a goal for his constituents and for his career as a politician. Senator Quayle was seen as the best and most qualified candidate for leading the procurement subcommittee. Below is a video that shows Senator Quayle finishing a twenty minute lecture on the importance of military procurement and the passing of the Defense Authorization bill, which contained a very well thought out and strong argument. Afterwards, Senator John Warner (ranking member of the Armed Services committee) thanks Senator Quayle for his hard work, especially in the areas of procurement, claiming he has done his homework. Senator Warner concludes by saying that both sides of the aisle rely on him.

3:59:30 to 4:00:43

https://www.c-span.org/video/standalone/?c4713085/armed-services-cmtte

          Members select specializations for several reasons. Herbert Asher wrote an article titled Committees and the Norm of Specialization, and claims three factors determine specialization; personal and professional background, perceptions of the concerns of present and future constituents, and committee assignment (Asher, p. 66). In some cases, members are placed on committees they did not necessarily want. Those that have the right committee, the right background, and have support from their constituents are more likely to maximize their specialty than members that do not. According to Asher, “Senators do not specialize as intensively or as exclusively in their committee work as House members do. Since decision-making is less committee-centered, there is less reward in committee-based specialization” (Asher, p. 67). Specialists differ between the House and the Senate. Senators are fewer and occupied in more committees, while Congressmen and congresswomen are able to focus their efforts a little better.

          Specialization lies within the various committees in congress. When a bill enters, it is usually referred to one or more committees to be debated or amended. Smith et al. discuss the roles of committees, stating, “Committees’ large, expert staffs and their extensive networks of allies in the executive branch and interest group community further enhance their informational advantage over competitors” (p. 175). Specialization is made possible by the staffs that come with each member, and with each committee. To further specialization, “…the presence of subcommittees is likely to produce additional specialization” (Asher, p. 69). Subcommittees offer comparative advantages between other subcommittees. Committees and subcommittees are notoriously known for calling in experts to discuss important issues with. The intention of the meeting can be simply asking for expert opinion, or perhaps to interview and investigate that expert. “Committee members sit through hearings, participate in discussions with lobbyists and executive branch officials, and often have previous experience with the issues their committee deals with” (Smith et al., p. 175). All of these qualities strengthen a member’s specialty. Below is a video of the Senate’s Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs committee hosting ranking members of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The video clip shows Senator Jeffrey Merkley (D-Oregon) asking SEC Trading and Markets Division Director, Robert Cook, questions about high-frequency trading.

55:50 to 58:00

www.c-span.org/video/standalone/?c4713081/sec-clip

          Senator Jeffrey Merkley called on Robert Cook’s opinion about high-frequency trading, and how it played a role in the May 2011 “flash-crash.” Current legislation has been drafted to try and regulate high-frequency trading to avoid unintended consequences in the derivatives market. This topic of course is very technical, and high-frequency trading is a new financial innovation not very well known amongst the public. For the Senate committee to make an educated and appropriate decision on whether or not to regulate high-frequency trading, along with how to even go about it, experts such as Robert Cook will be needed.

          Lobby groups also serve an important role as providing specialization. Committees are losing power, and as a result, their specialization is not being completely utilized. Barbara Sinclair states, “…Procedures such as multiple referral, post-committee adjustments, and the bypassing of committees have further eroded the committees’ influence, at least to some extent” (Sinclair, p. 276). Members do not always have time to devote resources when a vote is fast approaching. The absence of this slow legislative process in a sense bypasses specialization. However, having multiple committees of course requires more time, ultimately lengthening the bills movement towards a vote. Sinclair offers the pros to this process and says, “On the plus side, when legislation is referred to a number of committees, multiple perspectives are brought to bear on complex problems…Given the complexity of today’s problems, this is certainly a benefit even if some delay is the cost” (Sinclair, p. 15). There are arguments to both sides, but lobbyists will be there regardless of what method a bill follows. Lobbyists are now, “…better able to provide legislators with quick and accurate information” (Smith et al., p. 361). Lobbyists do provide biases in their fact sheets, but it is not in their interest to lie to a legislator and risk tarnishing their reputation among politicians. Allowing legislators to tap into lobbyists help them make decisions when they are, or are not, specialists on a specific issue. Since all 535 members are entitled to a vote, lobbyists and staff members are their safeguard when a particular member is not a specialist on a given topic. Below is a video of the Senate Rules & Administration committee having a hearing on lobbying reform. Former Congressmen Al Swift, now a lobbyist, is present at the hearing to offer insight from both the inside and the outside. His background and knowledge is definitely a special circumstance, and his insight appreciated.

2:17:57 to 2:19:48

www.c-span.org/video/standalone/?c4713089/congressmen-turned-lobbyist

References

Asher, Herbert B. “Committees and the Norm of Specialization.” American Academy of

Political and Social Science. January 1974: vol. 411 no. 1 p. 63-74

C-SPAN Video Library. “Changes at the Securities and Exchange Commission”

           November 16, 2011. Senate Committee Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.

           Retrieved at: http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/Changesatt

C-SPAN Video Library. “Defense Authorization” November 20, 1987. U.S. Senate. 

          Retrieved at: http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/DefenseA

C-SPAN Video Library. “Lobbying Reform” February 8, 2006. Senate Committee Rules

            & Administration. Retrieved at:  http://www.c-

spanvideo.org/program/LobbyingReform8

Grant, Lawrence V. “Specialization as a Strategy in Legislative Decision-Making.”

          American Journal of Political Science. February 1973: vol. 17, no. 1 p. 123-147

Patterson, Thomas E. We The People: A Concise Introduction to American Politics, 8th

          ed. New York: McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. 2009.

Sinclair, Barbara. Unorthodox Lawmaking: New Legislative Processes in the U.S.

          Congress, 3rd ed. Washington D.C.: CQ Press. 2007.

Smith, Steven S., Jason M. Roberts, and Ryan J. Vander Wielen. The American

          Congress, 6th ed. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2009.

U.S. Senate. 2011. “About the Committee System.” Retrieved at: <

          http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/committees/d_three_sections_with_teasers/co

          mmittees_home.htm>